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 Executive Summary 
 
The last decade has witnessed the birth of the New Legal Realism – an effort to go 
beyond the old realism by testing competing hypotheses about the role of law and politics in 
judicial decisions, with reference to large sets and statistical analysis. The New Legal Realists 
have uncovered a Standard Model of Judicial Behavior, demonstrating significant differences 
between Republican appointees and Democratic appointees, and showing that such differences 
can be diminished or heightened by panel composition. The New Legal Realists have also started 
to find that race, sex, and other demographic characteristics sometimes have effects on judicial 
judgments. At the same time, many gaps remain. Numerous areas of law remain unstudied; 
certain characteristics of judges have yet to be investigated; and in some ways, the existing work 
is theoretically thin. The New Legal Realism has clear jurisprudential implications, bearing as it 
does on competing accounts of legal reasoning, including Ronald Dworkin’s suggestion that 
such reasoning is a search for “integrity.” Discussion is devoted to the relationship between the 
New Legal Realism and some of the perennial normative questions in administrative law. 
 
 1 
The New Legal Realism 
Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein 
 
 
In 1931, Karl Llewellyn attempted to capture the empirical goals of the legal 
realists by referring to early “efforts to capitalize the wealth of our reported cases to make 
large-scale quantitative studies of facts and outcome.”
1 Llewellyn emphasized the “hope 
that these might develop lines of prediction more sure, or at least capable of adding 
further certainty to the predictions based as hitherto on intensive study of smaller bodies 
of cases.”
2 But Llewellyn added, with apparent embarrassment: “I know of no published 
results.”
3  
We are in the midst of a flowering of “large-scale quantitative studies of facts and 
outcome,” with numerous published results. The relevant studies have produced a New 
Legal Realism – an effort to understand the sources of judicial decisions on the basis of 
testable hypotheses and large data sets.
4 Our goals in this Essay, prompted by Peter 
Strauss’ illuminating discussion,
5 are to offer a few general remarks on the New Legal 
Realists and to place those remarks in the context of some of the central questions in 
administrative law. 
 
I. Law and Politics 
 
A. From Old to New Realism 
 
Llewellyn wrote in reaction to the formalist claim that law, as expressed in 
statutes and precedents, determined the outcomes of particular cases.
6  He believed that 
much of the time, existing law did not compel particular case outcomes, and that at times 
the law itself was contradictory. “[I]n any case doubtful enough to make litigation 
respectable[,] the available authoritative premises  . . . are at least two, and  . . . the two 
                                                 
1 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv L Rev 1222, 
1243-44 (1931).  
2 Id. at 1244. 
3 Id.  
4 As best we can determine, the term New Legal Realism first appears in Frank B. Cross, Political Science 
and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw U L Rev 251 
(1997). 
5 See Peter Strauss, U Chi L Rev (forthcoming 2008). 
6 Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 
(W. Edmonson and M. Golding, eds.) (2003). 2 
are mutually contradictory as applied to the case at hand.”
7 For Llewellyn, the 
indeterminacy, even incoherence, of law meant that “the personality of the judge” must to 
some degree explain case outcomes. In his view, “our government is not a government of 
laws, but one of laws through men.”
8 To modern readers, Llewellyn’s suggestions are far 
too crude. The personality of the judge surely can matter, but what, exactly, is meant by 
“personality”? More fundamentally, whether ours is a “government of laws,” and what it 
means for a system to be one “of laws through men,” are partly empirical questions.
9  
Empirical work on judicial behavior is not, of course, a new endeavor. An entire 
subfield of political science, known as “law and politics,” has contributed a large and 
illuminating empirical literature documenting the influence of ideology on judicial 
outcomes.
10 Some early contributions to this literature cast the influence of law (the legal 
model) as a competing hypothesis to the influence of judicial ideology (the attitudinal 
model). These studies often rejected the legal model in favor of the attitudinal model.
11 
More recently, political scientists have given greater attention to the institutional context 
of judicial decision making by positing and testing models of strategic behavior. 
For their part, legal academics long took little notice of “law and politics” 
political science.  Perhaps they did so because the empirical methodology was unfamiliar 
and different from their own.
12 But recently, the appetite for empirical work in general 
has grown rapidly among law professors, and empirical research within law schools has 
become so prevalent as to constitute its own subgenre of legal scholarship, “empirical 
                                                 
7 Llewellyn, supra note, at 1239. In the context of statutory interpretation, a famous reflection of this view 
is Llewellyn’s attempt to show that the canons of construction offset each other, producing contradiction 
and indeterminacy. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons, 3 Vanderbilt L Rev 395 (1950). 
8 Llewellyn, supra note, at 1242-43. 
9 We say “partly” because some conceptual and normative analysis is necessary to establish what, exactly, 
will be tested, and how to evaluate what is found. 
10 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisted 
(2002); Jeffrey A. Segal and Lee Epstein, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments 
(2005). 
11 Howard Gillman, The New Institutionalism, 7 Law & Courts 6 (1996-97) (describing the “reign of the 
attitudinal model”). 
12 See also Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 Perspectives on Pol 251 (2006) (arguing that political 
science literature on judicial behavior has not “received the attention it deserves” because it has ignored 
normative implications, overlooked the actual operation of legal institutions and actors, and failed to 
acknowledge the limitations of its data). 3 
legal studies.”
13 In view of the importance of judicial decisions as a source of law and 
their centrality to both teaching and scholarship in law schools, it is unsurprising that 
much of the burgeoning empirical legal scholarship focuses directly on judicial rulings 
and their sources.
14  
We believe that much of the emerging empirical work on judicial behavior is best 
understood as a new generation of legal realism.
15 The New Legal Realists are 
conducting what Llewellyn and his peers only envisioned – “large-scale quantitative 
studies of facts and outcome” that assess the influence of the judicial personality on legal 
outcomes. We suspect that the new realist studies of judicial behavior will erode the 
distinctions between “law and politics” political science and “empirical legal studies.” 
Through its conferences and professional journals, the economic analysis of law has long 
drawn contributions from both law faculties and economics departments. We hope, and 
                                                 
13 The most revealing development here is the emergence of a new journal devoted solely to empirical 
studies, with the (unsurprising but descriptive) name, The Journal of Empirical Studies and a new 
professional organization, the Society of Empirical Legal Studies. The causes of the renewed interest in 
empirical studies among law schools are intriguing and well worth sustained attention. We speculate that 
important factors in this change include the decline in the costs of computing and data-gathering, the 
increasing presence on law faculties of people with post-graduate training in both law and social sciences, 
and the prevailing sense in certain interdisciplinary fields, particularly economic analysis of law, that 
empirical work rather than abstract theory now presents the greatest opportunities for contributions. See 
also Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J Legal Educ 323, 
331-33 (1989) (listing reasons why empirical research runs counter to careerist objectives of legal 
academics, particularly untenured ones). 
14 See, e.g., Frank Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2006); James Brudney et al., 
Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 
60 Ohio LJ 1675 (1999); Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83 
Virginia Law Review 1717 (1983); Gregory Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisions, Ohio 
State L J, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=486148; Christina L. Boyd, Lee 
Epstein, and Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effect of Sex on Judging, Northwestern University 
Law School working paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1001748; Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, 
Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 Yale 
L.J. 1759 (2005) (studying cases from 1999-2001); Max M. Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller, 
Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, __ U Chi L Rev 
__ (2008) [this volume] . The prefatory “eg” should be taken seriously; in the limited space of this reply, 
we do  not attempt a comprehensive review of the relevant literatures. Apologies to the many whom we 
have omitted. 
15 Others have used the phrase New Legal Realism to describe a broader set of interdisciplinary inquiries 
not limited to judicial decision making. See, e.g., Howard Erlanger, et al., Is It Time for a New Legal 
Realism?, 2005 Wisc L Rev 335, 337 (2005) (“[N]ew legal realist scholars bring together legal theory and 
empirical research to build a stronger foundation for understanding law and formulating policy”); Stewart 
Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t What They Used to Be,” 2005 Wisc L 
Rev 365, 385-86 (2005) (describing the new legal realism as involving “the law in action . . . the gap 
between law on the books and the actual practices of legal officials and the public in cases of disputes”). In 
contrast, still others label recent studies of judicial behavior the new legal empiricism. See, e.g., Michael 
Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the 
New Empiricism, 2002 U Ill L Rev 819 (2002).  4 
are willing to predict, that the New Legal Realism will increasingly bring together 
scholarly efforts of both lawyers and political scientists; economists will play a 
substantial and probably growing role as well. 
A distinguishing feature of the New Legal Realism is the close examination of 
reported cases in order to understand how judicial personality, understood in various 
ways, influences legal outcomes, and how legal institutions constrain or unleash these 
influences. These inquires represent an effort to test the (old-style) realist claims about 
the indeterminacy of law, and to implement its call for empirical study of how different 
judges decide cases by responding to the “stimulus” of each case. Political science has 
devoted much attention to the Supreme Court, a sensible choice given the Court’s 
importance. But the New Legal Realism tends to focus on lower federal courts, because 
the random assignment of judges to cases is a sort of natural experiment that permits 
plausible causal inferences about the effect of judicial characteristics on outcomes.
16 
 
B. The Standard Pattern 
 
The New Legal Realists are beginning to make progress on these questions 
because of increasing agreement about how to measure the “personality of the judge” and 
the features of each case. What Llewellyn termed “personality,” the New Legal Realists 
have taken to mean the observable, personal characteristics of the judge, such as their 
political affiliations, demographics, and prior professional experience.
17  The goal is to 
develop testable hypotheses – and then to test them. 
The characteristics of the cases most commonly examined by the New Legal 
Realists are the types of litigants, the nature of their claims, and the procedural posture of 
the case. The New Legal Realism also seeks to capture the institutional context of judicial 
behavior.  Dimensions of the institutional setting include whether a judge renders her 
decision while presiding alone or as a member of a panel, and if as a member of a panel, 
whether the co-panelists have similar characteristics. An important stimuli – and 
                                                 
16 Some researchers are also investigating judges in state courts. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, 
and Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather Than 
Appointed Judiciary, U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 357 (August 2007), 
available http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008989. Much more remains to be done on this count; state courts are a 
fertile place for study, and little has been done to date. 
17 But see Heise, The Past, Present, and Future, supra note __ at __ (describing early attempts to examine 
the personality of the judge from a psychological perspective). 5 
sometimes an important constraint – is the law itself. Some legal scholars play up the role 
of legal constraints
18 while others emphasize what they see as the decisive role of the 
values, or commitments, of particular judges.
19 The old-style realists tended to adopt the 
latter position,
20 but they rested content with impressions and anecdotes. By contrast, the 
New Legal Realists take these claims about legal reasoning as hypotheses, which can and 
should be tested. They want to know when and how law is indeterminate and thus exactly 
how and when “the personality of the judge” matters for outcomes.  
To date, the question that has received the most attention from the New Legal 
Realists is the influence of a judge’s political ideology or attitudes.
21 This question has 
perennial interest because judicial ideology – perhaps as proxied by the party of the 
appointing president
22 – often appears influential in constitutional decisions, and it is a 
recurrent, even dominant, theme of media coverage of the Supreme Court. But do 
Republican appointees systematically differ from Democratic appointees?  It is 
reasonable to speculate that in ideologically contested domains – involving, for example, 
environmental protection, sex discrimination, abortion, and campaign finance law – the 
two sets of appointees will vote very differently. If so, how much do they differ? Do 
these differences persist in less ideologically contested domains? 
If party effects can be found, does the institutional setting of decision making 
matter as well? Much of the New Legal Realism has examined federal appellate 
decisions. In federal circuit courts, judges sit in three-member panels, and the New Legal 
Realists have investigated whether the presence of a judge’s colleagues on a panel 
influence her decision making. It is reasonable to speculate that when Democratic 
appointees sit on three-judge panels consisting exclusively of Democratic appointees, 
their voting patterns will be unusually liberal – and that when Democratic appointees sit 
                                                 
18 Within the New Legal Realism, this is the tendency in Frank Cross, Decisionmaking in the US Circuit 
Courts of Appeal, 91 California Law Review 1457 (2003). 
19 With the New Legal Realism, this is the tendency in Revesz, supra note; Revesz, by the way, played a 
significant role in spurring the New Legal Realism. 
20 See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note; Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 44 Harv L Rev 863 (1930). 
21 This issue is explored in many places, see, eg, William Landes and Richard A. Posner (unpublished 
manuscript 2007); Miles and Sunstein, Do Federal Judges Makes Regulatory Policy, supra note; Frank 
Cross, supra note; Sunstein et al., supra note. 
22 The appropriate measure of judicial ideology has been vigorously contested.  Compare Lee Epstein & 
Gary King, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship, 69 U Chi L Rev 135 (2002) with 
Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates about Statistical 
Measures, 99 Nw U L Rev 743 (2005). 6 
on three-judge panels with two Republican appointees, their voting patterns will be 
unusually conservative. It is even reasonable to speculate that it might be possible to do 
pretty well in predicting judicial votes, in some areas, by asking about the political 
affiliation of the appointing president – and perhaps equally well by asking about the 
political affiliation of the judge who appointed the two other judges on the panel. New 
Legal Realists describe the impact of the colleagues on an appellate panel on an judge’s 
own votes as “peer effects” or “panel effects.” 
A good deal of evidence on these questions has recently emerged. In many 




INSERT FIGURE 1 here [stylized version of standard model]  
 
In many areas of law, Democratic appointees cast liberal votes more often than 
Republican appointees do, whatever the partisan configuration of the panel. But the 
liberal voting rate typically increases with the number of copanelists who are Democratic 
appointees and correspondingly falls with the number of Republican appointees.  
Results of this kind have been found in so many areas that they might fairly be 
described as the Standard Pattern of Judicial Voting, at least in ideologically contested 
cases.
24 In the Standard Pattern, the political affiliation of the appointing president greatly 
matters. The observed panel effects are commonly interpreted as two behavioral 
responses. The first is ideological dampening: Republican appointees show fairly liberal 
voting patterns when sitting with two Democratic appointees, and Democratic appointees 
show fairly conservative voting patterns when sitting with two Republican appointees. 
The second is ideological amplification: Republican appointees show very conservative 
voting patterns when sitting with two Republican appointees; and Democratic appointees 
show very liberal voting patterns when sitting with two Democratic appointees. 
But the Standard Pattern is not universal. Republican appointees and Democratic 
appointees do not differ in their voting patterns in some areas in which differences might 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, [this volume]. 
24 Thus the Standard Pattern can be found in many places in Cass R. Sunstein, et al., Are Judges Political? 
(2006); Virginia Hettinger, Stefanie Lindquist, and Wendy L. Martinek, Judging on a Collegial Court 
(2006). 7 
be expected; examples include criminal appeals, property rights, congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause, and standing to sue.
25 Moreover, panel effects are not 
present in the important domains of abortion and capital punishment. In those domains, 
judges apparently vote their convictions, and are not influenced, at least in their 
conclusions, by the other judges on the panel.
26  
Other New Legal Realist work has begun to investigate the role of other aspects 
of a judge’s background, particularly the judge’s demographic characteristics, such as 
race and sex. These results mirror the findings for partisanship or ideology in two ways. 
First, just as with partisanship, these characteristics may influence a judge’s own vote as 
well as those of other judges on the panel. Second, these judicial characteristics matter in 
certain legal contexts but not in others. 
For example, a significant finding is that in sex discrimination cases, a judge’s sex 
matters; female judges are more likely to vote in favor of plaintiffs, and male judges are 
more likely to vote in favor of plaintiffs if a female judge in sitting on the panel.
27 In 
sexual harassment cases, there is a clear gender effect.
28 However, a judge’s race does not 
exert a meaningful influence in employment discrimination cases, an area where one 
might predict race would be particularly salient. In contrast, race matters in voting rights 
cases; African-American judges are more likely to vote in favor of plaintiffs, and white 
judges are more likely to vote in favor of plaintiffs if an African-American judge is 
sitting on the panel.




  Notwithstanding several advances in understanding judicial behavior, the New 
Legal Realism continues to have important limitations, and a great deal remains to be 
done. Some of these limitations involve date-gathering. Others are conceptual and 
normative. 
                                                 
25 See Sunstein et al., supra note, at 
26 See id. at 
27 See Lee Epstein et al., supra note (unpublished manuscript 2007) 
28 Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal 
Appellate Courts, 114 Yale L.J. 1759 (2005). 
29 See Adam Cox and Thomas Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum L Rev ___ (forthcoming 
2008). 8 
Most of the relevant studies are limited to published judicial decisions.
30  Such 
decisions are likely to be unrepresentative of the typical case, and if courts are more 
likely to publish difficult and controversial cases,
31 the estimates from published cases 
will likely overstate the actual effects of judicial ideology and other characteristics. A 
great deal might be learned by incorporating unpublished decisions into the analysis. But 
to the extent that an objective of the New Legal Realism is to understand the impact of 
judicial personality on law, rather than quotidian decisions lacking precedential value, 
published cases are relevant subjects of analysis.  
It also remains true that the current findings provide only parts of the overall 
puzzle. We know something, for example, about judicial behavior in EPA and NLRB 
cases between 1996 and 2006. But it would be much better to know about judicial 
behavior in a much broader range of administrative law cases in that period, and better 
still to be able to learn as well about cases from 1986 to 1996, and 1976 to 1986, and 
even 1946 to 1976. Even in the domain of administrative law, no one has explored the 
effects of party affiliation on purely procedural challenges to agency decisions. Studies of 
race, sex, and disability discrimination cases remain badly incomplete, limited as they are 
to relatively brief periods of time. Many areas of law remain entirely unstudied in the 
standard terms, including (for example) antitrust law, intellectual property, and 
bankruptcy. It would be useful to know in which areas of law and under what 
circumstances the judicial personality has the greatest (and the least) influence on 
decisions. 
In addition, we continue to know only a small amount about what might be 
learned with respect to aspects of judicial background and the effects of those aspects on 
judicial voting. What is the impact of age or of number of years on the bench? Of service 
as (for example) a prosecutor or a corporate lawyer? Of religious background? (Are 
                                                 
30 A valuable exception is Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag, Refugee 
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 Stan L Rev __ (forthcoming 2007) (studying published 
and unpublished immigration cases heard by immigration judges, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and 
the Circuit Courts of Appeals). On publication rates generally, see William L. Reynolds and William M. 
Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of 
Reform, 48 U Chi L Rev 573 (1981) (measuring publication rates and opinion lengths in the federal circuit 
courts). 
31 Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg, and Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence 
of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J Legal Stud 257, 277-81 (1995) (reporting the judicial 
characteristics do not affect outcomes in cases representative of the average docket of federal trial courts). 9 
judges of certain religious backgrounds likely to rule differently in abortion cases or sex 
discrimination cases or religion cases than judges of other religions or of no religion?) 
How do sex and race affect behavior in multiple areas of the law? In these domains, we 
know only the tip of the iceberg.
32 
Still more troubling is that the fact much of the New Legal Realism remains 
largely atheoretical. The preferences of judges and thus the predictions of how they will 
respond to law and court structure are often either absent or rudimentary. Our work in 
administrative law is vulnerable to just this criticism; our inquiry is simply whether 
judicial ideology matters to judicial votes in the context of Chevron and arbitrariness 
review cases. The mechanisms generating panel effects in particular remain inadequately 
understood.
33  An exception to the absence of behavioral theory is the set of papers that 
employ rational choice models to predict how the possibility of review by higher courts, 
such an en banc review of a panel’s decision, may influence a judge’s decision. A core 
prediction of these analyses is that the risk of reversal by an unfriendly overseeing court 
may induce a judge to alter her vote or the legal basis of her decision.
34  
A particular advantage of these models is that they generate (and test) predictions 
about a judge’s strategic choice of the grounds for a legal decision; in so doing, they 
move beyond the focus on mere votes and come closer to Llewellyn’s vision of studying 
the effect of judicial personality on legal reasoning in appellate decisions.
35 Even in the 
                                                 
32 See Cross, Decision Making, supra note at (providing some analyses of these characteristics in a random 
sample of published appellate decisions). 
33 See Sunstein et al.,  supra note (discussing possible explanations). 
34 See, e.g., Max M. Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial 
Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, __ U Chi L Rev __ (2008) [This Volume] (finding that judges 
depart whose political affiliation aligns with the circuit court’s partisan majority is more likely to depart 
from the Sentencing Guidelines); Max M. Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, J Law, Econ & Org 24 (2007) 
(finding that judges aligned with the circuit court tend to alter criminal sentences under the Sentencing 
Guidelines through law-base departures rather than fact-based adjustments); Joseph L. Smith and Emerson 
H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J Legal Stud 61 (2002) 
(presenting evidence on the choice between law- and fact-based decisions in administrative law). 
35 Also see Steven J. Choi and Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of 
Judges? __ J Legal Stud __ (forthcoming) (reporting that federal judges are more likely to cite judges of 
their own political party, particularly in high stakes litigation, and that judges are more likely to cite judges 
who cite them back); Michael Abramowicz and Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Citation to Legislative History: 
Contextual Theory and Empirical Analysis, Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 05-11, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=725919 (May 25, 2005) (reporting that the more judges of one 
political party on a circuit court or on a panel, the higher the rate of legislative history citations to 
legislators of that party, irrespective of the party of the judge authoring the opinion). 10 
absence of explicit rational choice models, other researchers have begun to consider the 
application of particular legal doctrines, rather than a judge’s votes, as a unit of 
analysis.
36 We think that a great deal might be learned by examining opinions, not just 
votes, though the coding problems are far more serious for the former than for the latter. 
In addition, the implications of the Standard Pattern for (old-style) legal realism 
and its opponents are not so clear, because the baseline level of ideological influence is 
unknown. Are the observed impacts of judicial ideology large or small? Committed 
realists, emphasizing the importance of political judgments, will want to declare a clear 
victory. They will stress the evident disagreement, in many domains, between Republican 
and Democratic appointees -- and thus point to the clear impact of political convictions 
on judicial decisions. But on the data as it stands, judicial policy preferences are only part 
of the picture.
37 In most domains, the division between Republican and Democratic 
appointees, while significant, is far from huge; the law, as such, seems to be having a 
constraining effect.
38 We are speaking, moreover, of the most contested areas of the law, 
where political differences are most likely to break out -- and also of appellate cases, 
where the legal materials are likely to have a degree of indeterminacy. For those who 
believe in the rule of law, and in the discipline imposed by the legal system, the results of 
the New Legal Realism need not be entirely discouraging. The glass is half-empty, 
perhaps, but it is also half-full. There is much greater room here for conceptual and 
theoretical analysis. 
The New Legal Realism also has jurisprudential implications, which remains to 
be explored. Consider, for example, Ronald Dworkin’s account of law as a search for 
“integrity,” through which judges seek both to “fit” and to “justify” preexisting legal 
decisions.
39 Dworkin’s account suggests that disagreement about law operates along the 
dimensions of fit and justification. Sometimes a particular outcome, however appealing, 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Mark J. Richards and Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision 
Making, 96 Am Pol Sci Rev 305 (2002) (developing a test for “jurisprudential regimes” that define relevant 
factors or set standards of review for subsequent decisions); Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, The 
Transformation of Voting Rights Act Litigation, working paper, University of Chicago Law School 
(October 29, 2007) (examining how judicial ideology correlates with the application of multi-factored tests 
in voting rights decisions). 
37 See Cross, supra note. 
38 See id. 
39 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986). 11 
will not fit precedent. Sometimes two or more possible outcomes show adequate fit, and  
the question is one of justification. (In Llewellyn’s view, this was a standard situation.
40) 
One reading of the empirical findings, and in particular of the Standard Model, is that 
Democratic and Republican appointees disagree along the dimension of justification. The 
high level of agreement between the two sets of appointees, in most domains, shows the 
disciplining power of “fit.” In hard cases, perhaps “fit” runs out, and it is not so 
surprising that Republican appointees will find that a stereotypically conservative 
position best justifies the law, and that Democratic appointees will disagree with that. 
Much more work needs to be done to see if this account is the right one, and if other 
accounts, perhaps rejecting Dworkin’s, do better. 
 
II. The New Legal Realism Meets Administrative Law 
 
In recent years, we have been particularly interested in empirical tests of two of  
the largest questions in administrative law. (a) How do federal judges deal with agency 
interpretations of law?
41 (b) What is the role of judicial politics in reviewing agency 
action that is alleged to be arbitrary?
42 
On both questions, the doctrinal instructions are reasonably clear. In the face of 
statutory ambiguity, judges are supposed to uphold reasonable agency interpretations.
43 
This standard is designed to reduce the policymaking discretion by federal judges -- and 
to ensure that the key political judgments will be made by agencies instead.
44 It is 
therefore natural to wonder: Are Republican appointees more likely to strike down liberal 
interpretations than conservative ones? Are Democratic appointees more likely to strike 
down conservative interpretations than liberal ones? We have found that the answer to 
both questions is “yes.”
45  This finding raises serious questions about the proposition that 
current doctrine has succeeded in eliminating a large policymaking role for the federal 
judiciary.
46 We have also found that panel effects aggravate party differences. Republican 
                                                 
40 See Llewellyn, supra note. 
41 Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Federal Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Test 
of Chevron, 73 U Chi L Rev 823 (2006). 
42 Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, U Chi L Rev (2007). 
43 See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 US 837 (1984). 
44 Id. at  
45 Miles and Sunstein, supra note, at  
46 See Miles and Sunstein, Do Federal Judges Make Regulatory Policy, supra note, at 12 
appointees, sitting on RRR panels, look starkly different from Democratic appointees on 
DDD panels.
47 The Standard Pattern can be found in this domain as well. 
It is also important to know about the real world of arbitrariness review – about 
the actual rate of invalidation of agency action challenged as “arbitrary” (or as lacking 
substantial evidence), and about the role of judicial policy preferences in decisions about 
whether agency have behaved arbitrarily. Before we began, we asked several 
administrative law specialists and federal judges to predict the invalidation rate, and the 
answers were frequently, “I have no idea.” Some people, including some judges, guessed 
that the invalidation rate would be about 10 percent. Studying cases involving the NLRB 
and the EPA, we have found that the invalidation rate is fairly high – 39% -- and that 
judicial policy preferences are playing a large role.
48  Republican appointees are more 
likely to invalidate liberal decisions than conservative ones; Democratic appointees are 
more likely to invalidate conservative decisions than liberal ones. Indeed, we were 
surprised to see that our findings involving review of agency interpretations of law are 
quite close to our findings involving review of agency decisions for arbitrariness. 
It is of course useful to bring empirical findings in contact with existing debates 
over existing doctrine. Peter Strauss, among the keenest participants in those debates, 
does not object to our methods or our findings, but he does offer an array of illuminating 
observations about what lessons to draw from them.
49 His most important doctrinal 
objection is that it is important to distinguish between “State Farm review” and review of 
the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board for “substantial evidence.” By State 
Farm review, he means to refer to relatively intensive hard look that the Court endorsed 
in the State Farm case; substantial evidence review, he believes, is a different kettle of 
fish. 
It is hazardous to disagree with Peter Strauss on doctrinal issues (or anything 
else), but as a purely doctrinal matter, we are not so sure that he is right. In State Farm, 
the Court purported to set out a general framework for assessing whether agency 
                                                 
47 Notably, it is also possible to offer certain tests of the behavior of Supreme Court justices. We know 
which are relatively neutral, in the sense that their validation rates do not differ depending on whether the 
agency’s interpretation is liberal or conservative, and which are relatively restrained, in the sense that they 
tend to vote to uphold agency interpretations of law. We also know which are relatively partisan and which 
are relatively activist. See id. at  
48 Miles and Sunstein, supra note. 
49 Peter Strauss, U Chi L Rev 13 
interpretations of law are arbitrary – a framework that would seem to apply in many 
areas. And as an empirical matter, we are even less sure that Strauss is right. Indeed, we 
have produced an independent study of all court of appeals cases citing State Farm, and 
that study attests to the perceived generality of the Court’s framework.
50 The overall 
validation rate in the cases citing State Farm was slightly lower – 51% -- than among 
cases not citing State Farm, but it is difficult to generalize about this difference because 
the number of cases citing State Farm was small (87). More importantly, we observed 
that when the court cited State Farm, political commitments influenced the operation of 
judicial review in much the same way as did when the court did not cite it. The validation 
rates of Democratic and Republican appointees showed the familiar see-saw pattern, 
rising when the nature of the agency decision aligned with the political party of the 
appointing president and falling when it did not.
51 Panel effects were also substantial. 
Democratic appointees showed higher liberal voting rates (64%) when sitting with at 
least one other Democratic appointee. Republican appointees showed lower liberal voting 
rates (39%) when sitting with at least one other Republican appointee. The resulting 
difference between the two sets of appointees – 25% -- is comparable to our findings in 
the set of decisions that did not cite State Farm.  
 True, it is reasonable to ask whether State Farm review, announced in a case 
reviewing a high-profile exercise in rulemaking, is the same as substantial evidence 
review of more mundane questions of fact and policy standardly raised by NLRB orders. 
But judicial review of such orders is undertaken under the standards established by 
Universal Camera
52 and Allentown Mack,
53 and those standards are relatively stringent, 
in a way that is not easy to distinguish, in principle, from State Farm review. In short, we 
                                                 
50 See Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Arbitrary? An Empirical Analysis of State Farm, 
University of Chicago Law School unpublished manuscript (May 24, 2007). Full disclosure: We began our 
investigation into arbitrariness review with this study, limited to cases citing State Farm. But we concluded 
that the number of such cases was too small for a detailed examination of panel effects, so we compiled a 
more comprehensive data set instead. 
51 When the agency decision is liberal, the rate at which Democratic appointees voted to validate under 
State Farm was 61% and for Republican appointees, it was 47%. When the agency decision is conservative, 
the Democratic validation rate dropped to 40% and the Republican validation rate rose to 57%. For both 
Republican and Democratic appointees, then, the spread between liberal and conservative agencies was 
significant when State Farm was cited. Notably, however, it was significantly higher for Democratic 
appointees (21%) than for Republican appointees (10%).  
52 Universal Camera Corp v. NLRB, 340 US 474 (1951). 
53 Allentown Mack Sales and Service v NLRB, 522 US 359 (1998). 14 
do not think that State Farm carves out a separate “kind” of judicial review of agency 
action, distinguishable from ordinary arbitrariness review or from substantial evidence 
review. We think that State Farm offers the state-of-the-art account of arbitrariness 
review, and we are willing to speculate that substantial evidence review is not 
meaningfully different as a doctrinal matter.
54 
Strauss is correct, however, to point to an array of distinctive features of NLRB 
orders. Suppose that he is therefore right to say that EPA cases and NLRB cases are 
relevantly different. It remains true that most of the patterns found in the one domain can 
be found in the other as well. The real world of judicial review of EPA decisions appears 
to be quite close to the real world of review of NLRB decisions. We hope that in the 
future, others will see whether those patterns apply to other agencies as well.  
But Strauss’ largest claim lies elsewhere. He contends that our major “point” is to 
show that hard look review should be softened
55 – that the Court should rethink State 
Farm to the extent that it invites the kinds of policy-driven judicial oversight that our  
evidence reveals. But our major “points” are empirical, not normative. We sought to 
understand the real-world of arbitrariness review, not to change it. To be sure, we do read 
our data to suggest the need to reduce the role of judicial policy preferences in review of 
agency action. We do not approve of a situation in which Republican appointees are 
invalidating liberal agency decisions, or Democratic appointees invalidating conservative 
agency decisions, at a high rate. If agency decisions really are arbitrary, they should be 
struck down. But it is reasonable to worry that on DDD panels, conservative decisions are 
being wrongly invalidated as arbitrary -- and that the same is true for liberal decisions 
reviewed by RRR panels. Moreover, the size of the ideological effect in these 
arbitrariness cases is about as large as that seen in other areas of law.
56 
But we are also interested in considering the possibility of softening the current 
hard look, if only because such softening should reduce the likelihood that judges will 
invalidate agency decisions only when they are genuinely arbitrary. A softer look should 
ensure that judicial policy preferences do not, in the end, account for invalidation on 
                                                 
54 Of course it is likely that the stringency of review will vary depending on a range of factors, including 
the technical quality of the issues and whether the agency has a strong or weak reputation. 
55 Strauss at  
56 See, e.g., Sunstein, et al., Are Judges Political?, supra note __ at __. 15 
arbitrariness grounds. But Strauss is correct to say that our findings are not sufficient to 
justify any such softening. We need to know what would be lost as well as what would be 
gained. Hard look review probably serves as an important ex ante deterrent and ex post 
corrective to bad decisions, rooted in insufficient care, interest-group pressures, or 
political commitments that override sound analysis.
57 A relaxation of judicial review 
could produce more genuine arbitrariness even as it reduced the risk that judicial policy 
preferences would play a role in invalidation of agency action. We do not mean to take a 
final stand on whether arbitrariness review should be softened. 
 
III. Whither the New Legal Realism?  
 
  In 1931, Llewellyn asked for a “temporary separation of Ought and Is” in the 
realist study of law.
58 But the need for a just legal system is urgent; it cannot wait until 
researchers achieve a comprehensive understanding of the “Is.” Legal academics and the 
lawyers they train must often make normative evaluations of legal rules and institutions 
on the basis of only partial information.
59 They ought do so with full awareness of the 
limitations of their analyses, and we hope that we have done so as well. We do not place 
such faith in our statistical analysis as to claim that it should be the sole criterion for 
evaluating judicial performance,
60 but we are willing to offer some tentative speculations.  
Professor Strauss raises the possibility of mandatory judicial diversity.
61 Any such 
mandate would generate many questions, but we do find, in both Chevron and 
arbitrariness cases, that our findings of political judging are driven almost entirely by 
what happens on DDD and RRR panels. Strikingly, there is little difference, in both 
domains, in how Republican appointees vote on RRD and RDD panels, and Republican 
                                                 
57 See id; Paul Pederson, Yale LJ (197?); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 
Supreme Court Review. 
58 See Llewellyn, supra note, at 
59 Jack Goldsmith and Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U Chi L Rev 
153, 164-65 (2002). Barry Friedman has even criticized studies of judicial decision for too often lacking 
“normative bite.” Friedman, infra note __ at 262 (“What matters, at bottom, is whether the positive 
scholarship has something to teach about how law and legal institutions operate in a way that is pertinent to 
how they should, and to the aspirations put upon those institutions by society”). 
60 But see Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 Cal L Rev 299, 299 (2004); Stephen 
J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge 
Performance, 78 S Cal L Rev 23 (2004). 
61 Strauss [This volume].  Also see Schanzenbach and Tiller, [This Volume] supra note ___ at__ 
(contemplating hierarchical judicial diversity). 16 
appointees, on such panels, look quite similar to Democratic appointees on the same 
panels. In administrative law cases at least, the role of political judging is sharply 
diminished on mixed panels. If we take ideological voting together with ideological 
amplification, the New Legal Realists might be prepared to be suspicious, on normative 
grounds, of what is likely to happen on RRR or DDD panels.  
The remedy is not clear. Knowledge sometimes provides a degree of inoculation, 
and on an optimistic view, judicial awareness of the risks associated with unified panels 
might provide a safeguard. If a DDD panel finds itself striking down a conservative 
regulation as arbitrary, or if an RRR finds itself doing the same with a liberal regulation, 
there is a good reason for every member of the panel to pause and rethink. It also makes 
sense to consider en banc review in cases in which unified panels go in the predicted 
direction – and for the Supreme Court to consider such cases to be promising ones for 
grants of certiorari. 
In the domain of administrative law, however, our major submission is empirical, 
not normative: the strong correlation between validation rates and the ideological 
alignment of judges and agencies strongly suggests that judicial ideology affects 
appellate rulings about whether an agency action is arbitrary. In the future, bolder 
normative claims may be possible for many questions. An immense amount of material 
has long been available with which to test hypotheses about the sources of judicial 
behavior. The New Legal Realism remains in its infancy; as it grows, we will learn much 
more. 17 
FIGURE 1 
Liberal Voting Rates of Circuit Court Judges in Arbitrariness Review Cases  
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